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ABSTRACT 
Information technology (IT) has proven to be critical in the operation of businesses 
today. The banking industry is one of the industries that are most reliant on IT. The 
banking industry has enjoyed greater efficiency and effectiveness in their operations 
owing to the widespread use of IT.  However, due to IT and continuous technological 
advancements, new threats such as cyber risk have surfaced, and the banking 
industry has experienced the most cybercrime incidents. In addition to the banking 
industry being the most targeted by cyber-criminals, cybercrime incidents have 
detrimental impacts on the industry. As a result, it is crucial for banks to employ 
effective cyber risk management processes. 
The South African banking industry is required by the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB) to align their cyber risk management processes to the cyber resilience 
guidance document issued by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures 
(CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).  The 
CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance contains guidelines that should be addressed 
within a bank’s cyber risk management framework. This study seeks to establish 
whether the Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (ICIC) framework 
addresses the guidelines contained in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. 
The ICIC framework is effective for managing cyber risk and allows an organisation to 
modify it to suit its specific needs and objectives. The objective of the study is to 
recommend to the South African banking industry, a framework for managing cyber 
risks that is effective and that addresses the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines. 
The results were gathered by analysing the ICIC framework and mapping it against 
the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines. 
The results revealed that the ICIC framework addresses up to 71 percent of the CPMI 
–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines. The study therefore recommends that instead of 
building a new cyber risk management framework, the South African banking industry 
should adopt the ICIC framework and modify it by adding the 29 percent of the CPMI 
–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines not addressed by the ICIC framework. All the 
guidelines contained in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance will then be 
addressed within the modified ICIC framework. South African banks will also achieve 
effective management of cyber risks through the ICIC framework.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND LAYOUT 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Businesses are continuously exposed to risks, and thus it is vital for them to identify 
the risks they are exposed to and to manage them effectively (Asgary, 2016; Giahi, 
Sahebjamnia & Torabi, 2016; Hopkin, 2017). In the event that a risk materialises, 
effective risk management plays the role of keeping the impact of that risk to a 
minimum (Wong & Shi, 2015). While some risks have a low impact on business, others 
can lead to the discontinuation of main business functions, a complete shutdown of 
the entire business, or even great financial losses (Ashford, 2016; Hopkin, 2017). 
Among the risks that have high impacts, Information Technology (hereafter, IT) risks 
are the most pervasive (Berisha-Shaqiri, 2015; Giahi et al., 2016; Asgary, 2016).  
Businesses have grown very reliant on IT to a point where if an IT system fails, the 
business could have their main business functions interrupted and large amounts of 
money could be lost (Berisha-Shaqiri, 2015; Marx & Hohls-du Preez, 2017).  
The banking industry has most of its functions supported and maintained by IT 
(Bishnoi & Devi, 2017). The industry has gone through a drastic transformation in order 
to improve its service delivery capacity, and IT played a big role in achieving this 
(Harguem & Echatti, n.d). The role of IT in the banking industry is continuously 
advancing and is expected to advance at an increasing rate in the future (Lata, 2016). 
With IT in banking increasingly advancing, banks are pressed to invest most of their 
capital expenditure on IT (Sattar, 2014; Yadurvedi, 2015; Flinders, 2017).  
IT capital expenditures by banks have resulted in several benefits enjoyed by the 
industry (Binuyo & Aregbeshola, 2014; Eruemegbe, 2015). Banks are now able to 
facilitate network transactions, save on expenses, save time, improve organisational 
performance and have achieved upward shifts in profits because of IT (Eruemegbe, 
2015; Maryam, Khamesi & Houshang, 2016). IT has however exposed the banking 
industries to new risks and if these are not effectively managed, main business 
functions could be interrupted, leading to great financial losses (Deloitte, 2016; Marx 
& Hohls-du Preez, 2017). In order for business in the banking industry to continue 
uninterrupted, the industry does not have the option of getting rid of IT but instead 
must employ effective IT risk management tools (Lata, 2016). 
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1.2 IT IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
The banking industry as currently understood, has been redefined and re-structured 
due to the widespread use of IT in its business processes (Tiwari & Kumar, 2012). 
Before the widespread use of IT, customers would stand in long queues to withdraw 
their money, and banks used to create handwritten receipts as well as keep large 
numbers of general ledger books (Agrawal, 2016; Sravanthi, 2016; Korte, 2017). With 
the use of technology, banks have improved their functions as well as the services 
they provide (Dandago & Rufai, 2014; Bishnoi & Devi, 2017). An increased use of IT 
is envisaged in future due to continuous innovations (Gupta & Chanava, 2013). 
Moreover, banks are already pursuing the latest emerging technologies and continuing 
to be innovative (Yadurvedi, 2015).  
Examples of technological innovations that have emerged in banking are Automated 
Teller Machines (hereafter, ATMs), Electronic Fund Transfers (hereafter, EFT), debit 
cards, mobile banking, credit cards, tele-banking, e-banking, the establishment of call 
centres and many more (Sattar, 2014; Yadurvedi, 2015; Lata, 2016). Most of these 
innovations have resulted in banks’ heavy utilisation of payment systems that are IT 
enabled, have internet-based access and new modes of delivery to extend their 
services and manage their fast-increasing customer needs (Harguem & Echatti, n.d). 
It is almost impossible to find a function in a bank or a bank product that is independent 
of technology, and it is for this reason that large amounts of money are expended on 
IT (Mclean, 2013; Deloitte, 2016; Flinders, 2017). In 2016, investment banks in the 
United States of America (hereafter, U.S.A) invested R132.43 billion in technology, 
spending R90.61 billion on supporting existing IT facilities in their organisations, and 
the remainder on new technologies (Flinders, 2017).  
Banks are advancing mainly as a result of technology, and technological 
advancements in banks have resulted in convenience, speed and time-saving 
methods of carrying out business (Lata, 2016). Some of the more positive impacts 
evident in the banking industry and attributable to IT are: banks are experiencing 
increased profits, competitiveness, marketability and improved organisational 
performance (Marinč, 2013; Eruemegbe, 2015; Maryam et al., 2016). However, in 
order for the industry to completely enjoy the positive impacts of technology, they need 
to pay careful attention to IT risks (Svatá & Fleischmann, 2011; Lata, 2016).  
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IT risks in the banking industry range from strategic, operational and reputational risks 
(Sravanthi, 2016; Miyake, 2016). An expansion of these risks includes unauthorised 
transactions, processing errors, destroyed files, data theft, degraded or incapacitated 
systems, obsolete technologies, coordinated service attacks, disruption of key 
business processes outsourced to vendors, internet manipulation and cybercrime 
(Eruemegbe, 2015; Bevan, Ganguly, Kaminski & Rezek, 2016). Cybercrime is the 
most common, frequent and significant IT risk in the banking industry (Mawudor, Kim 
& Park, 2015) 
1.3 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The banking industry is faced with the highest number of cybercrime incidents 
compared to other business industries (Stechyshyn, 2015; Camillo, 2016; Miyake, 
2016). In the year 2015 alone, the banking industry lost an average of R188.19 million 
due to cybercrime incidents (Camillo, 2016). Cyber-criminals also drained R44.3 
million from 9 000 Tesco bank's current accounts in just one month (Ashford, 2016; 
Cox & Lahti, 2017). In June 2014, cyber-criminals managed to launch malicious 
programs and stole sensitive information from the U.S.A’s biggest bank, JP Morgan 
Chase (Stechyshyn, 2015).   
Cybercrime is a technology enabled crime, the core of which is represented by acts 
against the integrity, availability and confidentiality of computer information (United 
Nations Office on Drugs & Crime, 2013). Bank exposure to the risk of cybercrime is 
due to the complexity and intense utilisation of IT systems and technologies such as 
internet banking, mobile banking, digital wallets and ATMs (Ashford, 2016; Korte, 
2017). With the fast-growing technologies and increasing usage of IT in banking, 
cyber-criminals will have more platforms to attack banks, and the nature of cybercrime 
in banking will continue to evolve (UNODC, 2013; Stechyshyn, 2015). For that reason, 
it is important for banks to carefully address this evolving threat of cybercrime 
(Stechyshyn, 2015; Standard Bank, 2017; Deloitte, 2018).  
Most South African banks had cybercrime listed as one of the major risks in their 
annual integrated reports for the 2017 financial period (Binuyo & Aregbeshola, 2014; 
Nedbank, 2017). In the same year, the South African Banking Risk Information Center 
reported that South African banks encountered 13 438 cybercrime incidents in total, 
which led to losses amounting to more than R250 million (Smith, 2018; Kgosana, 
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2018). As a result, they have prioritised continuously improving cyber risk 
management processes in order to effectively manage cyber risk (Standard Bank, 
2017; Nedbank, 2017; First Rand Bank, 2017). These efforts by South African banks 
to counter cybercrime are evidenced by the considerable amounts of money expended 
on cyber risk management (Deloitte, 2018). 
In May 2017, the South African Reserve Bank (hereafter, SARB), through the office of 
the Registrar of Banks, issued a guidance note in terms of section 6(5) of the Banks 
Act 94 of 1990 (SARB, 2017). In this guidance note, the SARB required all South 
African banks to align their cyber risk management processes to the cyber resilience 
guidance issued by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (hereafter, 
CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (hereafter, 
IOSCO), known as the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance for Financial Market 
Infrastructures (hereafter, FMI) (Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association 
(hereafter, SIFMA), 2016; Standard Bank, 2017). The CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidance is the latest international best practice relating to cyber risk management for 
banks (SIFMA, 2016; Deloitte, 2018). On a regular basis, the office of the Registrar of 
Banks will assess the appropriateness and adequacy of the South African banks’ 
cyber risk management processes based on the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidance (SARB, 2017). The CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance contains 
guidelines that should be addressed within a bank’s cyber risk management 
framework (Bank for International Settlements (hereafter, BIS) & International 
Organization of Securities & Commissions, 2016). It is therefore important for the 
banking industry to have a framework in place that is specifically designed to manage 
cyber risks (Kopp, Kaffenberger & Wilson, 2017).  
A framework currently adopted by banks in South Africa is BASEL III (Standard Bank, 
2012; Barclays, 2017). The challenge with the BASEL III framework is that it is not 
specific to cyber risks, but is generic to overall risks (Svatá & Fleischmann, 2011; Kopp 
et al., 2017). The Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (hereafter, ICIC) 
framework on the other hand, is designed to specifically manage cyber risks (National 
Institute of Standards & Technology (hereafter, NIST), 2014). The ICIC framework was 
issued by the U.S.A’s NIST and is widely followed by banks across the globe 
(Stechyshyn, 2015). This framework is commended for its efficiency as well as its 
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ability to be modified to suit each organisation’s unique cyber risks, cyber risk 
tolerances, and cyber risk management objectives (NIST, 2014; Spitzner, 2017).   
1.4 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
As discussed above, it is important for South African banks to align their cyber risk 
management processes to the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance, thus they 
must adopt a cyber risk management framework that is not only effective, but also 
addresses the guidelines contained in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. 
Therefore, this study seeks to establish whether the ICIC framework addresses the 
CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines.  
Problem statement 
To establish whether the ICIC framework addresses the guidelines contained in the 
CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance.  
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this study was to establish whether the ICIC framework addresses the 
guidelines as set out in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. In order to 
achieve the aim of this study, the following objectives were to be met: 
 To identify and explain cyber risks that the banking industry is exposed to as 
well as the need for effective cyber risk management methods in the banking 
industry; 
 To discuss the framework currently adopted by South African banks to manage 
cyber risks; 
 To understand the ICIC framework and the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidance;  
 To map the ICIC framework against the guidelines contained in the CPMI–
IOSCO cyber resilience guidance; and 
 To recommend to the South African banking industry, a framework for 
managing cyber risks that is effective and addresses the guidelines contained 
in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. 
The objectives of this study were achieved through a literature review (Chapter 2–3) 
on cyber risks and cyber risk management in the banking industry, as well as the ICIC 
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framework and CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. Chapter 4 shows the ICIC 
framework mapped against the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines.  
The ICIC framework was mapped against the guidelines contained in the CPMI–
IOSCO cyber resilience guidance because: 
 CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance is the latest (it was issued in the year 
2016) international best practice relating to cyber risk management for the 
banking industry; and 
 South African banks are requested by the SARB to align their cyber risk 
management processes to the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance.  
The results deduced from the study are summarised in Chapter 5.  
1.6 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
 
 The scope is limited to discussing cyber risks and not all IT risks.  
 The study discusses the impacts of cyber risks only on the banking industry.  
 Currently, the South African banks have adopted the BASEL III framework. This 
study discusses BASEL III and the ICIC framework, however, the BASEL III will 
not be mapped. Only the ICIC framework is mapped against the CPMI–IOSCO 
cyber resilience guidelines. 
 A second reviewer on the data being analysed and the mapping will not be 
included.  
1.7 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.7.1 Research design 
 
A research design refers to a plan followed in solving the research problem (Klopper, 
2008).  It is therefore important for the research design to be linked to the research 
objectives, which are formulated from the research problem (O’Leary, 2004). A 
research design should address the data needed and the methods the researcher 
adopts to gather and analyse that data, in order to achieve the research objectives 
(Kothari, 2004).   
The objectives of this research aim to establish whether the ICIC framework addresses 
the guidelines as set out in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. They also 
aim to identify and explain the cyber risks and their impact that the banking industry is 
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exposed to, and the need for effective cyber risk management methods in the banking 
industry.  
In order to achieve the above-mentioned research objectives, the researcher adopted 
the qualitative approach whereby the data extracted from the content analysis contains 
secondary data. The qualitative approach to research relates to subjective evaluation 
of a research phenomenon (Kothari, 2004). This approach is usually used to extract 
secondary data (O’Leary, 2004). The secondary data is gathered from textbooks, 
publications, the internet, online journal articles, and the online library of the University 
of Johannesburg.  
In the qualitative approach, phenomenology, grounded theory, phenomenographic, 
hermeneutics, ethnography and content analysis are the different techniques used for 
analysing data (Bengtsson, 2016). Content analysis is the technique that formed the 
research design for the purposes of this study. Content analysis is a technique 
whereby the researcher analyses existing documents to test theoretical subjects in 
order to enhance understanding of the data collected (Elo & Kyngäs, 2007).   
1.7.2 Research methodology 
Research methodology is a systematic process by which the researcher solves a 
research problem (Kothari, 2004). It refers to the science relating to how research is 
going to be conducted (Sahu, 2013). In describing research methodology, the 
researcher must articulate the various steps adopted in solving the research problem 
(Kothari, 2004). In this research process, the adopted steps were as follows: 
Step 1: Identify the research problem 
The identified research problem relates to the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance 
and the guidelines contained therein. The research problem is to establish the ICIC 
framework addresses the guidelines as set out in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidance 
 
Step 2: State the research objectives  
The research objectives, as outlined in section 1.5, were derived through a thorough 
enquiry to understand the problem.  
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Step 3: Review the literature 
Literature is made up of written sources relevant to the study field the researcher has 
chosen (Klopper, 2008). The relevant literature review can be found in Chapters 2 and 
3. These chapters inform the readers of cyber risks and their impact on the banking 
industry, and the need for effective cyber risk management methods. These chapters 
also inform the reader of the risk management framework that South African banks 
have currently adopted and discuss the ICIC framework and the CPMI–IOSCO cyber 
resilience guidance. The research in these chapters was conducted by gathering 
secondary data. 
Step 4: Prepare the research design  
The research design adopted in this research is explained in section 1.7.1.  
Step 5: Sample design and sample selection 
A population consists of all the items under consideration in a research field (Kothari, 
2004). In order to generalise the results of the research, a representative sample must 
be selected from the population (O’Leary, 2004). A sample refers to a few items 
selected from a population (Klopper, 2008). The process through which the researcher 
selects a sample from a population is referred to as a sample design (Kothari, 2004).  
For the purposes of this study, the population was identified as all the risk management 
frameworks for the banking industry. For the selection of the sample, a non-probability 
sampling design was adopted. In this design, the researcher deliberately and 
purposefully selects a sample from the population by applying own judgment (Kothari, 
2004). The selected sample in this study was the ICIC framework. The researcher 
deliberately and purposefully selected this framework for the following reasons: 
 It is not a framework generic to all risks, but a framework for specifically 
managing cyber risks (Svatá & Fleischmann, 2011; Spitzner, 2017);  
 It is flexible and efficient for managing cyber risk, which is vitally important for 
the banking industry (Roman, 2014; Clozel, 2016); and 
 It is widely adopted by banks across the globe (Stechyshyn, 2015). 
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Step 6: Collect the data 
The researcher aimed to collect data through a qualitative approach. The literature 
was collected from textbooks, publications, the internet, online journal articles, and the 
online library of the University of Johannesburg. In the literature, the researcher aimed 
to find different cyber risks and their impacts on the banking industry, the risk 
management framework currently adopted by the South African banking industry, and 
the ICIC framework and the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance.  
Step 7: Analyse the data 
For this study, a qualitative content analysis procedure was followed. During this 
process, the ICIC framework and the CPMI–IOSCO were analysed. The analysis was 
done in order to establish the ICIC framework addresses the guidelines as set out in 
the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. To establish this, the ICIC framework 
practices were compared against each guideline in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidance. This process takes place in Chapter 4.  
Step 8: Interpret the data 
During the interpretive process, the results of the study were scrutinised. From the 
analysis, the researcher determined which CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines 
are addressed by the ICIC framework. The interpretation of the data informed on the 
following possibilities: 
 The ICIC framework addresses none of the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidelines; 
 The ICIC framework addresses some of the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidelines; or 
 The ICIC framework addresses all of the CPMI IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidelines. 
The data interpretation could facilitate the South African industry to decide whether to 
adopt the ICIC framework in order to be aligned to the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidance, as required of them by the SARB.  
 
 
10 
 
1.7.3 Ethical considerations 
Ethical considerations refer to ensuring that the rights of research participants are 
protected, informed consent is obtained, and that ethical approval has been obtained 
from the institution following the institutional ethics review process (Klopper, 2008). 
Careful consideration regarding all ethical concerns was taken for this study. Ethical 
clearance by the University of Johannesburg’s School of Accountancy Research 
Ethics Committee was granted. The ethical clearance report is attached at the end of 
this study. Moreover, the sources used throughout this research have been 
acknowledged by referencing them according to the UJ Harvard referencing method. 
1.8 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter one: Introduction and layout 
In this chapter the background to the research, the problem statement and the 
research objectives are discussed. The research design and methodology is also 
addressed in this chapter.  
Chapter two: Cyber risks and cybersecurity in the banking industry  
This chapter provides the cyber risks that the banking industry is faced with as a result 
of its heavy reliance on IT. The chapter also studies the impact of these cyber risks on 
business in the banking industry. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the need for 
effective cyber risk management measures in the banking industry.  
Chapter three: Risk management frameworks and the CPMI–IOSCO cyber 
resilience guidance 
This chapter discusses the risk management framework currently adopted by the 
South African banking industry, namely BASEL III. The chapter analyses the ICIC 
framework issued by NIST and the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance for FMIs.  
Chapter four: The empirical study and research findings 
In this chapter, the ICIC framework is mapped against the guidelines of the CPMI–
IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. In this chapter, the results of the mapping are 
analysed and discussed.  
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Chapter five: Conclusions 
 
This chapter summarises the results deduced from the study. Thereafter, conclusions 
are drawn and areas for future research suggested.  
1.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the importance of effectively managing the IT risks that result 
from the intense reliance on IT by businesses. The banking industry was highlighted 
as one of the industries that rely heavily on IT for the functioning of their critical 
functions and in the operation of most of their products. Even though technological 
advancements have reshaped the industry by transforming the manner in which 
business is conducted and improving overall organisational performance, banks face 
new risks as a result of IT. The impacts of these IT risks cause business interruptions 
and considerable financial losses. Amidst the IT risks that the banking industry is 
exposed to, cyber risk is the most common and the most frequent. The banking 
industry suffers the most cyberattacks and loses significant amounts of money as a 
result. The management of cyber risks is therefore an important process for the 
banking industry, which has, as a result, allocated considerable amounts of money 
towards managing cyber risks. Numerous banks across the globe follow the ICIC 
framework to manage cyber risk. South African banks are required by the SARB to 
align their cyber risk management processes to the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidance by adopting or building a cyber risk management framework that addresses 
the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines. 
The following chapter enumerates different types of cyber risks and discusses their 
impact on the banking industry. This study also discusses cybersecurity and its 
importance in the banking industry. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CYBER RISKS IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The banking industry is experiencing greater efficiency and effectiveness in their 
business as a result of technological advancements (Dzomira, 2014; Shackleford, 
2015; Brady, 2018). However, these technological advancements have attracted 
threats such as cyber risks (Li, 2017; Alese, Thompson, Alowodu & Oladele, 2018).  
Cyber risk is the most common topic in business today and the banking industry is one 
of the most targeted by cyber-criminals. (Rama, 2016; Grobler, 2018; Kundu, Islam, 
Jui, Rafi, Hossain & Chowdhury, 2018). As a result, the banking industry has 
experienced the highest numbers of cyberattacks and these have been increasing at 
an alarming rate (Lagazio, Sherif & Cushman, 2014; Shackleford, 2015; Van Den 
Bergh & Pretorius, 2017).  
One of the earliest documented cybercrimes, which occurred in 1958, involved an 
unauthorised change to bank records (Li, 2017). Till today, banks are still impacted by 
cyberattacks, which with time and developments in technology, have become more 
numerous and sophisticated (Lemieux, 2015; Brady, 2018). Moreover, cyber-criminals 
have a well-developed and growing market for cybercrime acts as well as the selling 
of cybercrime tools and techniques used to perform cybercrime activities (Lagazio et 
al., 2014). It is therefore essential that the banking industry has an understanding of 
cybercrime, the cybercrime risks that the industry is exposed to, the impact of their 
occurrence on business, and the importance of cybersecurity (Ben-Asher & Gonzalez, 
2015; Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2016; Van Den Bergh & Pretorius, 2017). 
2.2 DEFINING CYBERCRIME 
Cybercrime can be divided into four different categories: cyber-pornography, cyber-
violence, cyber-trespass and cyber-deception and theft (Alese et al., 2018). There are 
several definitions of cybercrime as construed by groups and individuals (Van Den 
Bergh & Pretorius 2017). The most common definition of cybercrime refers to 
computer related malicious acts, which include the manipulation of and damage to 
electronic information, unauthorised access to computer systems, software piracy, as 
well as physical damage to computer systems (Lagazio et al., 2014; Lemieux, 2015). 
Cybercrime not only involves malicious acts but also the misuse of the functions that 
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IT systems are originally designed for (Shalaginov, Johnsen & Franke, 2017). Banking 
institutions suffer the risk of cybercrime resulting from mischievous acts of human 
attackers who thrive on destroying or defrauding the target victim (Brady, 2018). 
The risk of cybercrime is one of the most important risk management topics in business 
today (Grobler, 2018). It has been classified as an operational risk specifically in the 
banking industry, and it is therefore recommended that it be addressed as such 
(Standard Bank, 2017; First Rand, 2017; Brady, 2018). Operational risk is the risk of 
loss that results from deficient or unsuccessful internal processes, systems and 
people, or from external occurrences (Kopp et al., 2017).  This risk is present across 
all business activities in the banking industry, and furthermore, banks attribute this risk 
as a top-ranking threat to business growth (Baker, 2015; Nedbank, 2017). 
2.3 CAUSES OF CYBERCRIME 
Technology has created a platform for cybercrime, and technological growth is directly 
linked to the increased avenues for cyberattacks (Standard Bank, 2017; Shalaginov 
et al., 2017; Kundu et al., 2018). The first cybercrime was committed following the 
creation of the first computers and even currently, cybercrime has kept pace with the 
technological developments that have taken place since then (McLean, 2013; Li, 
2017). Technological developments have also contributed to the sophistication of 
perpetrators of cybercrime (Nedbank, 2017; Shalaginov et al., 2017; Zhijun & Ning, 
2017).  
This ongoing sophistication of cyber-criminals is one of the main reasons for the 
reported increasing number of cybercrime incidents globally (Standard Bank, 2017; 
Kundu et al., 2018). Continuous rapid growth of computer power, the rise of financial 
technology (hereafter, fintech), the availability of cyber weapons and increasing 
numbers of technological devices also contribute to this ever-increasing number of 
cybercrime incidents (Grobler, 2018).  
Cybercrime incidents affecting more than one country at a time are caused by global 
connectivity and the internet (Lemieux, 2015; Gallegos-Segovia, Bravo-Torres, Larios-
Rosillo, Vintimilla-Tapia, Yuquilima-Albarado & Jara-Saltos, 2017). The internet, which 
is one of the ways through which the world is interconnected and has the fastest 
growing areas of technological infrastructure development, forms an important part of 
businesses today (Dzomira, 2014; Kundu et al., 2018). As a result, it is the most 
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utilised platform by cybercrime perpetrators, intensifying the risk of cybercrime in 
business, especially in banking (Lagazio et al., 2014; Sarika & Varghese, 2017).   
Digitisation of banks is the main cause for cybercrime in banking (Standard Bank, 
2017; Kopp et al., 2017). According to Mohurle & Patil (2017), digitisation of banks 
refers to such technological advancements as mobile technology, cloud computing, 
artificial intelligence, advanced analytics, robotics, biometrics and fintech, which have 
become the core of banking (Nedbank, 2017). With the growth of digitisation and the 
interconnectivity of banking functions, cyber-criminals are growing more and more 
sophisticated, leaving the banking industry prone to cybercrime risks (Dzomira, 2014; 
Shackleford, 2015). The main reason that these cybercrime acts are directed towards 
banks is that banks keep their money in cyberspace, and the aim of cyber-criminals is 
always financial gain (Dzomira, 2014).  
Banks operate more through various external service providers, which form part of the 
banks’ supply chain (States News Service, 2018). A weak link in that supply chain may 
expose banks to cyber risks no matter how strong their cybersecurity measures are 
(Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2016; Mbelli & Dwolatzky, 2016). Other causes of 
cybercrime in banking include breaches of confidential records, running ageing 
systems, less control of access to cyber systems, and shortage of cybersecurity skills 
(Mbelli & Dwolatzky, 2016; Standard Bank, 2017). Other cybercrime causes are 
weaknesses in digital identity management, the ease with which false identity can be 
utilised, point-of-sale terminals, payment networks, inadequate cybercrime laws, and 
the rise of on-line banking (Dzomira, 2014; Lemieux, 2015).  
A significant number of cyberattack attempts are successful in banks due to the fact 
that line managers and senior managers often lack oversight when it comes to 
deviations from the banks’ existing cyber risk controls (Dzomira, 2014). The lack of IT 
skills and appropriate legal frameworks at national level to address cybercrime has 
magnified the problem of cybercrime in African countries, including South Africa 
(Cassim, 2011; Lagazio et al., 2014).  
2.4 TYPES OF CYBERCRIME 
The nature of cybercrime has grown sophisticated over time and businesses are yet 
to experience even more sophisticated cyberattacks (Shackleford, 2015; Standard 
Bank, 2017; Nedbank, 2017; Grobler, 2018). A common range of cybercrimes include 
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identity theft, malware, social engineering, distributed denial of services (hereafter, 
DDoS) attacks and botnets (Shackleford, 2015; Rama, 2016; Van Den Bergh & 
Pretorius, 2017).  
Attacks to IT infrastructures as well as compromised bank cards and accounts are 
frequent cyberattacks in the banking industry globally (Lagazio et al., 2014). The 
cyberattacks that the South African banking industry is exposed to include cyber fraud, 
ATM fraud, internet fraud, digital attacks, as well as the common cyberattacks such as 
ransomware and phishing attacks (Standard Bank, 2017; Nedbank, 2017; Brady, 
2018; Kundu et al., 2018). Even though Standard Bank experienced a considerable 
decline in the number of phishing attacks, this attack is the most frequent in South 
African banks (Mbelli & Dwolatzky, 2016; Standard Bank, 2017). The following 
sections explain the different types of cybercrimes. 
2.4.1 Identity theft 
Identity theft occurs when one person makes use of the identity characteristics of 
another without their permission (Dzomira, 2014; Minniti, 2016). Before advancements 
in technology, identity theft involved merely masquerading to physically look like 
someone else, but nowadays identity theft is mostly committed online and with 
malicious intent (Van Den Bergh & Pretorius, 2017). The main aim of the identity thief 
is to obtain and use the victim’s personal information such as credit card information, 
identity numbers, address, usernames and passwords, for personal financial gain 
(Pandey, Shah, Sharma & Farik, 2016; Zaeem, Manoharan, Yang & Barber, 2017). 
Cyber-criminals can also steal an employee’s credentials and use them to gain remote 
access to infiltrate and steal money from the organisation where that person is 
employed (Shackleford, 2015).  
2.4.2 Malware 
Malware is a combination of the words ‘malicious’ and ‘software’ (Rama, 2016). With 
this attack, a malicious program is created to penetrate a system's software with the 
aim of compromising the software’s integrity, confidentiality and availability by 
damaging, stealing and blocking access to information systems and assets 
(Shackleford, 2015; Minniti, 2016). These malicious programs are commonly 
distributed through flash drives, emails, websites and social media without the user’s 
knowledge (Page, Jourdan, Bochmann, Flood & Onut, 2018). Types of malware 
 
 
16 
 
attacks include spamming, phishing, ransomware, virus, Trojan horse, worms and 
spyware (Mbelli & Dwolatzky, 2016; Van Den Bergh & Pretorius, 2017). Below are 
descriptions of the various types of malware attacks.  
2.4.2.1 Spamming  
Spamming is one of the common types of cybercrime and is committed by sending 
unwanted emails and messages to the victim (Dzomira, 2014; Pandey et al., 2016). 
These emails and messages are meant to lure victims to click on links that will allow 
the cyber-criminal to obtain certain personal information about the victim (Van Den 
Bergh & Pretorius, 2017).   
2.4.2.2 Phishing  
Another common type of cybercrime and the most frequent in business is phishing 
(Van Den Bergh & Pretorius, 2017). Phishing, just like spamming, also involves the 
sending of misleading emails and messages (Minniti, 2016; Baykara & Gürel, 2018). 
These emails and messages are disguised to look like they are from a legitimate 
source in order to deceive the victim into revealing their personal information such as 
pin codes, passwords, account numbers and authentication credentials (Rama, 2016; 
Jensen, Dinger, Wright & Thatcher, 2017). According to security experts, 91 percent 
of all cyberattacks start with phishing attacks. Moreover, it is predicted that phishing 
attacks are predicted to continuously grow in number and sophistication (Jensen et 
al., 2017; Sarika & Varghese, 2017).  
Examples of sophisticated phishing methods are smishing and vishing (Dzomira, 
2014). Smishing is a combination of phishing and Short Message Services (hereafter, 
SMS) (Joo, Moon, Singh & Park, 2017). This method of phishing tricks the victim by 
sending them an SMS that lures them into making retail payments by clicking on a link 
using their mobile phones, to accounts masquerading as legitimate, (Yeboa-Boateng 
& Amanor, 2014; Park, 2014). Vishing, on the other hand, is a method of phishing 
where the attacker uses a voice call to lure the victim into providing their personal 
details, which the attacker then uses to steal the victim’s money and cause harm 
(Yeboa-Boateng, & Amanor, 2014; Shahriar, Klintik & Clincy, 2015). 
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2.4.2.3 Ransomware  
This is one of the most terrible malware-based cyberattacks (Van Den Bergh & 
Pretorius, 2017). It is usually introduced through a phishing attack (Deloitte, 2015). 
When a ransomware enters a computer, the cyber-criminal is able to lock the user’s 
access to files or computer systems with an encryption key (Gallegos-Segovia et al., 
2017; Grant Thornton, 2017; Mohurle & Patil, 2017). The user will then receive a pop- 
up warning message requesting a monetary ransom in order for them to retrieve that 
encryption key and unblock the access (Deloitte, 2015; Pandey et al., 2016; Mohurle 
& Patil, 2017; Kundu et al., 2018).  
Wannacry is one of the most recent types of ransomware attack, which encrypts 
computers, disks and files, and then demands that a ransom be paid into three bitcoin 
accounts within a period of three days in return for a decryption key (Mohurle & Patil, 
2017; Grant Thornton, 2017). Wannacry ransomware attacks are accomplished 
through phishing emails that contain malicious programs (Mohurle & Patil, 2017). 
Petya is another type of a ransomware attack which makes use of other hacking tools 
to steal confidential data from a computer system, spread a malicious code to other 
windows system administration tools, then after an hour it reboots and encrypts the 
entire system or files (Ernst & Young, 2017) 
2.4.2.4 Virus  
Virus is a well-known cyberattack whereby an unwanted malicious code is transferred 
to a non-malicious computer program (Dzomira, 2014). The malicious code aims to 
either destroy or corrupt the program (Van Den Bergh & Pretorius, 2017).  
2.4.2.5 Trojan horse  
This malware-based cyberattack is sent through to a user as a misleading program 
that appears to be non-threatening (Marx, Schönfeldt, Watt, Van Dyk, Maré & 
Ramuedzisi, 2011; Van Den Bergh & Pretorius, 2017). This program imitates a 
legitimate program, however, it contains a malicious code and steals the victim’s user 
credentials (Dzomira, 2014). Trojans are often installed in banking systems to record 
the user’s keystrokes in order to capture the user’s banking credentials and use them 
to transfer funds from the user’s account to the attacker’s account (Deloitte, 2015). 
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2.4.2.6 Worms  
This malicious program is able to reproduce itself and spread to other computers 
connected to one network (Dzomira, 2014). It is similar to a virus, however, a worm 
spreads through networks while a virus can spread through any medium (Van Den 
Bergh & Pretorius, 2017).  
2.4.2.7 Spyware  
Spyware attackers trace all the digital activities of a user without their permission and 
knowledge (Rao & Yalamanchili, 2012). Spyware is normally disguised as legitimate 
software and if undetected, can restrict bandwidth, steal personal data and generate 
numerous pop-up messages (Van Den Bergh & Pretorius, 2017). 
2.4.3 Social engineering 
Social engineering attack is a method whereby cyber-criminals use social skills and 
psychological manipulation to deceive people into revealing personal information 
(Pandey et al., 2016; Gallegos-Segovia et al., 2017). Through social engineering the 
cyber-criminal can obtain confidential information such as company information, 
system access credentials, account numbers and any other sensitive information the 
cyber-criminal might need (Yeboa-Boateng & Amanor, 2014; Rama, 2016). One of the 
common ways to achieve this is to send an email to the target, making it appear as if 
it is from a legitimate friend trusted by the target (Van Den Bergh & Pretorius, 2017). 
Phishing attempts, malware attacks, and password attacks are examples of social 
engineering tools (Rama, 2016; Sarika & Varghese, 2017; Baykara & Gürel, 2018). 
2.4.4 Distributed Denial of Services attacks (DDoS) 
DDoS attack means causing an online service to be down or unavailable (Gu & Liu, 
n.d). A malware is then injected into the user’s computer so that the user’s attention 
can be drawn to the DDoS attack, which will give the cyber-criminal access into a 
system (Pandey et al., 2016).  
2.4.5 Botnets 
Botnets are a network of infected computer systems that are controlled by hackers 
who perform illegal activities such as sending spams (Antonioli, Bernieri, & 
Tippenhauer, 2018). These illegal activities are performed by making use of computer 
bots to put together a network of infected computer systems (Pandey et al., 2016). 
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Botnets exploit internet services like Hypertext Transfer Protocol (hereafter, HTTP), 
Internet Relay Chat (hereafter, IRC), email, and Domain Name System (hereafter, 
DNS) in order to commit other cybercrimes such as DDoS, malware distribution and 
identity theft (Antonioli et al., 2018). 
2.5 IMPACTS OF CYBER RISK INCIDENTS ON THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
The impacts of cyber risk incidents are always detrimental (Shackleford, 2015). After 
a successful cyberattack, businesses may experience monetary penalties, piracy, 
legal costs, drops in stock price, security costs, loss of customer confidence and 
overall damage to reputation (Shackleford, 2015; Pandey et al., 2016). The banking 
industry is strongly impacted by cybercrime, and common impacts of cyber risk 
incidents experienced by banks are financial losses, fraud, reputational damage, 
impacts on competitiveness, and business interruptions (McLean, 2013; Lagazio et 
al., 2014; Jensen et al., 2017; Strauss, 2017). The impacts of cyber risk incidents in 
the banking industry are further discussed below:  
2.5.1 Financial losses  
Following a cybercrime incident, a bank is most likely to launch forensic investigations 
which require time, effort and most importantly, money (Lagazio et al., 2014; Strauss, 
2017; Zhijun & Ning, 2017; Kopp et al., 2017). Other ways in which banks can lose 
money after a cyberattack are through overspending on remedying the damage 
caused and indemnifying customers who may have lost money during cybercrime 
incidents (Lagazio et al., 2014; Lemieux, 2015; Cox & Lahti, 2017). Some cyber risk 
incidents, for example, identity theft and phishing, have a direct impact on the 
profitability of the affected organisation (Minniti, 2016; Jensen et al., 2017). 
In addition to cybercrime investigations, impacts on profitability, remedying processes 
and indemnifying customers, cyberattacks result in massive financial losses simply 
because cyber-criminals are always financially motivated (Lemieux, 2015; Pandey et 
al., 2016; Strauss, 2017). It is always the main aim of cyber attackers to extort money 
from the victim, especially from banks (Dzomira, 2014). According to the South African 
anti phishing report, South African banks have lost considerable amounts of money to 
phishing attackers (Mbelli & Dwolatzky, 2016). Bank customers also suffer significant 
financial losses to malware attackers, who use customers’ computers, mobile phones 
and tablets to steal from them (Lemieux, 2015).  
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2.5.2 Fraud  
Advanced cyberattacks such as malware attacks and identity theft result in the 
perpetration of fraud (Dzomira, 2014). More banking fraud incidents are foreseeable 
in the future due to ongoing advancements in technology and cybercrime in banking, 
(Standard Bank, 2017). Banking fraud is committing fraud by making use of online 
technology to illegally transfer money from one bank account to another (Alese et al., 
2018). Fraud in banking is an area of concern globally and has negative financial 
impacts on both banks and bank customers (Dzomira, 2014). 
2.5.3 Reputational damage 
Reputational damage refers to negative impacts on an organisation’s brand and its 
customer relations (Kopp et al., 2017). Customers may suffer financial losses as well 
as inconvenience when having to replace their bank cards and bank accounts 
(Shackleford, 2015; Cox & Lahti, 2017). As a result, angry customers may complain 
on public platforms such as social media, consequently contributing to damaging the 
bank’s reputation (McLean, 2013). Reputational damage can result in revenue losses, 
diminished customer loyalty, and loss of customers to competitors (Lagazio et al., 
2014).  
2.5.4 Impacts on competitiveness 
The banking industry is a heavily competitive industry (Lagazio et al., 2014). As soon 
as customers are affected by cybercrime taking place in their bank, they are most likely 
to move to the next bank (Strauss, 2017; Lagazio et al., 2014) 
2.5.5 Business interruptions 
Cyberattacks can detrimentally affect a computer systems’ normal functioning 
(Strauss, 2017). This may result in banks experiencing business interruptions (Ben- 
Asher & Gonzalez, 2015; Deloitte, 2015).  
2.6 CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT (CYBERSECURITY) 
In the past, banks used to guard themselves against heavily armed burglars who broke 
into banks in order to physically steal money from till points and vaults (Brady, 2018). 
However, in this age, crimes against banks are committed in cyberspace because 
large amounts of money and information are kept there (Dzomira, 2014; Alese et al., 
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2018). For this reason, it is important for banks in this age to employ effective 
cybersecurity measures in order to manage cyber risk (Dzomira, 2014; 
Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2016).  
Cybersecurity refers to measures put in place in order to protect information 
infrastructures and the organisation's network from cyber-criminals (Ben-Asher & 
Gonzalez, 2015; Van Den Bergh & Pretorius, 2017). Information infrastructures are 
inclusive of computer systems, telecommunication systems, processes, networks, 
facilities, technological assets and the internet (Lemieux, 2015; Van Den Bergh & 
Pretorius, 2017). Cybersecurity is also defined as an approach to safeguard 
cyberspace from cybercrime, such as information breaches (Mclean, 2013; Mbelli & 
Dwolatzky, 2016). In essence, it is a holistic approach for managing cyber risk that 
covers prevention, mitigation and reaction (Mclean, 2013). 
2.6.1 The importance of cybersecurity in the banking industry 
Cybersecurity is important for banks since the banking industry is the most targeted 
by cyber-criminals (Shackleford, 2015; Baker, 2015; SARB, 2017). Thus, banks need 
to decide on cybersecurity methods in order to manage the cyber risks they are 
exposed to (Kopp et al., 2017; Alese et al., 2018). These cybersecurity methods 
should not only be appropriate but should also be commensurate with the cyber risks 
facing the industry (Kopp et al., 2017).  
2.6.2 Cybersecurity methods for banks 
Banks should always be cognisant of the fact that the nature of cybercrime will 
continue to evolve, and should therefore ensure that their adopted cybersecurity 
methods keep pace with evolving cybercrime (Lemieux, 2015; Deloitte, 2018). 
Common cybersecurity methods include fire walls, encryptions, and keeping backup 
or archive records at a separate location (Kopp et al., 2017). Banks can also transfer 
risk to a third party by purchasing a cyber insurance policy whereby the insurer will 
cover losses or damages resulting from cybercrime incidents (Lemieux, 2015; Kopp 
et al., 2017). Cybersecurity awareness and education for bank users and employees 
is another important cybersecurity method (Dzomira, 2014; Pandey et al., 2016; Alese 
et al., 2018). In addition to these methods, it is important for the banking industry to 
follow a suitable framework in managing cybercrime and ensuring that the cyber risk 
problem is not compounded (Cassim, 2011). Chapter 3 elaborates on this framework.  
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2.7 CRITICAL LINK TO THE STUDY 
The stated research problem relates to the management of cyber risks in the banking 
industry. In order to solve the research problem, one of the objectives was to identify 
and explain cyber risks that the banking industry is exposed to as well as the need for 
effective cyber risk management methods in the banking industry. Therefore, this 
chapter discussed the different types of cybercrime prevalent in the banking industry, 
the causes of cybercrime, the impacts of cybercrime, and the importance of cyber risk 
management methods in the banking industry.  
2.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed cyber risks in banking, their causes and impacts on business. 
Bank digitisation is the main reason cybercrime has become intense in banking. It was 
established that since the very early stages of technology, the banking industry has 
been a primary target for cyber-criminals. As a result, banks suffer numerous and 
sophisticated cyberattacks, with phishing being the most frequent cyber risk in 
banking. Inadequate cybercrime laws and lack of appropriate legal frameworks are 
also notable reasons for this thriving cybercrime. The aim of cyberattacks is usually 
financial gain. Consequently, banks can suffer massive financial losses, among other 
things, following a cybercrime incident. Crimes against banks in this age are 
committed in cyberspace due to the fact that large amounts of money and information 
are kept there. Thus, it is important that banks should employ effective cybersecurity 
methods to manage cyber risks. In addition to cybersecurity methods, adhering to a 
suitable cyber risk management framework for managing risk is important.  
The following chapter discusses the risk management framework currently adopted by 
the South African banking industry, namely BASEL III. The ICIC framework and the 
CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance are also studied in depth. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS AND THE CPMI–IOSCO CYBER 
RESILIENCE GUIDANCE  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A number of South African legislations have been passed for the purpose of combating 
the growth of cybercrime (Mbelli & Dwolatzky, 2016). These include the Electronic 
Communications and Transmissions Act 25 of 2002, the Electronic Communications 
Security Pty (Ltd) Act 68 of 2002, and the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 
2013 (Sutherland, 2017). Despite these Acts, the banking industry is still experiencing 
increased complexity in combating and managing cybercrime (Barclays, 2017). As a 
result, the industry has resorted not only to complying with these regulations but also 
manages cyber risks through frameworks (Svatá & Fleischmann, 2011; Kopp et al., 
2017). 
Cyber risks differ from other risks in nature and sophistication (Internet Security 
Alliance, 2013; Kopp et al., 2017). As a result, a framework designed to manage all 
risks is not sufficient, nor is it effective in managing cyber risks because of their 
different nature and high complexity (NIST, 2014). It is therefore important for the 
banking industry to have a framework in place that specifically addresses the 
management of cyber risk (Kopp et al., 2017).  
3.2 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
A framework currently adopted by the banking industry in South Africa is BASEL 
(Standard Bank, 2012; Barclays, 2017). BASEL is a regulatory framework designed to 
strengthen the capital base of the banking industry because a weak capital base can 
lead to a financial crisis, which will in turn weaken the economy (Gomes, King & Lai, 
2017; Boora & Kavita, 2018). Therefore, the key purpose of the BASEL framework is 
to promote a more secure and resilient financial system, thereby stabilising the 
banking industry and the economy (Deloitte, 2014).  
The global financial crisis that took place in 2008 brought about greater focus on the 
significance of implementing the BASEL framework (Boora & Kavita, 2018). Following 
the global financial crisis, there have been frequent additions to the BASEL framework, 
causing it to become more complex (Deloitte, 2014). Due to this increased complexity, 
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most banks find it difficult to implement the BASEL framework (Adesina, 2017). 
According to a study conducted in 2016, South African bankers are of the view that 
the BASEL framework is irrelevant within the South African banking system, and the 
implementation thereof will lead to increased banking costs (Nkopane, 2016). 
Over the years, BASEL has been developed from BASEL I to BASEL III (Nkopane, 
2016). The BASEL III framework consists of three pillars. (Achterberg & Heintz, 2012; 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2017). The first pillar provides the capital 
calculations requirements for credit, market and operational risks (Achterberg & 
Heintz, 2012). The second pillar outlines the process through which a bank should 
review its overall capital adequacy (BCBS, 2017). The second pillar also addresses a 
bank’s risk management processes and the supervision thereof (Deloitte, 2014). In the 
third pillar, the BASEL III framework provides disclosure requirements for the reporting 
of risks, risk management and capital, with the intention of strengthening market 
discipline (BCBS, 2017). The challenge with the BASEL III risk management 
framework is that it is generic to overall risks, thus it is ineffective in managing cyber 
risk (Svatá & Fleischmann, 2011; Kopp et al., 2017). The ICIC framework, on the other 
hand, is designed to specifically manage cyber risks (NIST, 2014).  
The ICIC framework is commended for its flexibility, robustness, cost effectiveness 
and efficiency in managing cyber risks, hence it is widely adopted by banks across the 
globe (Spitzner, 2017; Miron & Muita, 2014; Clozel, 2016). The numerous banks that 
have adopted the ICIC framework have found it to be an effective and helpful cyber 
risk management tool (Stechyshyn, 2015; Spitzner, 2017; Roman, 2014). It is also 
important to note the flexibility that the ICIC framework provides to organisations, and 
the ability to modify it in order to suit those organisations' unique cyber risks, cyber 
risk tolerance and cyber risk management objectives, thus making it easy to implement 
(NIST, 2014; Spitzner, 2017). The Financial Stability Institute is of the opinion that the 
ICIC framework is a valuable starting point for effectively managing cyber risk 
(Crisanto & Prenio, 2017).  
3.3 THE EVOLUTION OF THE ICIC FRAMEWORK  
The ICIC framework was issued by NIST (Stechyshyn, 2015). It was developed 
through a collaboration between the private sector and the U.S.A’s government (Stine, 
Quill, & Witte, 2014). It was designed to secure critical infrastructures against cyber 
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risks since they are targets for cyberattacks (Benardo & Weatherby, 2015). Critical 
infrastructure refers to assets and systems, either virtual or physical, which are vital to 
a country (Ciglic, McKay, Hering & Moore, 2017).  The incapacity or destruction of 
such assets and systems can result in negative impacts on the security, national public 
health, national economic security and safety of that country (Stine et al., 2014). These 
critical infrastructures include financial systems among other things (Miron & Muita, 
2014). The ICIC framework provides procedures for understanding, managing and 
reporting cyber risk both internally and externally (Stine et al., 2014) 
The creation of the ICIC framework relied on existing international standards, practices 
and procedures that have proven to be effective (Roman, 2014). The framework is 
continually revised as implementation stakeholders discover areas of development 
(Ciglic et al., 2017). The revisions reflect the continually evolving nature of cybercrime 
(Dimon, Sweet & Bolten, 2018).  
There are currently two versions of the ICIC framework (Eggers, 2018). Version 1.0 
was issued in February 2014 and version 1.1 was issued in April 2018 (Eggers, 2018; 
Benardo & Weatherby, 2015). Version 1.1 is not a replacement but rather an update 
of version 1.0 (Eggers, 2018). It emphasises that businesses should assess their cyber 
risks, along with the costs and benefits of their cyber risk management strategies 
(Eggers, 2018).  
3.4 OVERVIEW OF THE ICIC FRAMEWORK 
The ICIC framework is risk-based and is made up of three components: the framework 
core, the framework profile and the implementation tiers (NIST, 2014; Stine et al., 
2014). These components are further discussed in the following sections. 
3.4.1 The framework core  
The framework core is a set of cybersecurity activities, their expected outcomes, and 
relevant references that are common across critical infrastructures (Anderson, 2017). 
It is made up of five functions, which are presented in the first column of Table 3.1 
below (Vigliarolo, 2017). These functions help organisations express their cyber risk 
management by arranging information, addressing threats, enabling risk management 
decisions, and are improved by learning from preceding activities (NIST, 2018). Under 
each function, the framework core identifies fundamental categories and 
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subcategories as illustrated in Table 3.1 (Stine et al., 2014). In the second column 
named ‘categories’, an organisation should subdivide a function into groups of 
cybersecurity categories of objectives directly connected to program-related needs 
and specific activities (NIST, 2018). Examples of these categories are asset 
management, detection processes, access control, and identity management (Keller, 
2018). In the third column labeled ‘subcategories’, an organisation should further 
divide each category into a set of expected results that will lead to the achievement of 
the cybersecurity objectives provided in each category (NIST, 2018). Each 
subcategory is then matched with informative references (Keller, 2018). Informative 
references, in the fourth column, are the guidelines, standards, practices or methods 
an organisation elects to implement in order to achieve the results expected from each 
subcategory (Stine et al., 2014). Table 3.1 below is an illustration of the framework's 
core structure (NIST, 2018).  
Table 3.1: Framework core structure  
 
The five framework core functions mentioned above are defined in the following 
sections. 
3.4.1.1    Identify 
The activities in this function are fundamental and critical to the effective usage of the 
framework (NIST, 2018). It is important for organisations to have a complete 
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understanding of their digital and physical assets and their interconnectedness 
(Anderson, 2017). Organisations must identify and understand the following (NIST, 
2018): 
 The business context; 
 The resources that support critical functions; and 
 The related cybersecurity risks. 
Understanding the above will aid the organisation to correctly focus their cyber risk 
management efforts (Anderson, 2017). Outcome categories within this function 
include asset management, governance, business environment, risk assessment and 
risk management strategy (NIST, 2018). 
3.4.1.2    Protect 
The protect function enables organisations to alleviate the impact of a possible 
cybercrime incident (NIST, 2014). In this function, organisations must ensure that 
there are appropriate access controls to safeguard their digital and physical assets 
(Anderson, 2017). Outcome categories within this function include data security, 
management and access control, awareness and training, maintenance, protective 
technology and procedures for information protection (NIST, 2018). 
3.4.1.3    Detect 
Within this function, organisations must have measures in place to identify cybercrime 
events in a timely manner (Anderson, 2017). Outcome categories in this function 
include irregularities and events, detection processes and continuous monitoring 
(NIST, 2018). 
3.4.1.4    Respond 
The respond function means taking action to address a detected cybercrime event 
and minimise the impact thereof (Anderson, 2017). Response planning, 
communication, analysis mitigation and improvements are the outcome categories 
that fall within this function (NIST, 2018). 
3.4.1.5    Recover 
This function supports the ability to restore functions and infrastructures affected by 
cybercrime incidents (NIST, 2014). Recovering to normal operations as soon as 
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possible will minimise the impact of cybercrime events (Anderson, 2017). Recovery 
planning, communication, and improvements are the outcome categories within this 
function (NIST, 2018). 
3.4.2 The framework profile 
The framework profile involves the process of aligning the framework's core functions 
and categories with the organisation’s business requirements, resources and risk 
tolerance (Stine et al., 2014). It also helps organisations to describe the state of 
cybersecurity activities (Keller, 2018). This is done by establishing road maps in order 
to identify gaps between achieved cybersecurity outcomes and outcomes that still 
need to be achieved (Vigliarolo, 2017). Finally, action plans to address these gaps 
need to be developed to make sure that every cybersecurity outcome is achieved 
(NIST, 2018).  
3.4.3 The framework implementation tiers 
There are four tiers of implementation (Anderson, 2017). The tiers represent the 
degrees of rigour and complexity in cyber risk management activities (NIST, 2018). 
They range from tier one to tier four (Keller, 2018). Tier one is called ‘Partial’, tier two 
‘Risk Informed’, tier three ‘Repeatable’ and tier four ‘Adaptive’ (Vigliarolo, 2017). The 
higher tiers are considered the more complete implementation of the framework (NIST, 
2018).  The following section discusses the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance, 
against which the ICIC framework is mapped in Chapter 4. 
3.5 CPMI–IOSCO GUIDANCE ON CYBER RESILIENCE FOR FMIs 
CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance for FMIs was issued by CPMI and IOSCO on 
29 June 2016 (SARB, 2017; World Federation of Exchanges, 2018). Every South 
African bank is required by the SARB to align their cyber risk management processes 
and practices to the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance (SARB, 2017; Standard 
Bank, 2017). The South African Registrar of Banks uses this as a basis to assess the 
adequacy of the South African banks’ cyber risk management processes and practices 
(SARB, 2017). This guidance is the latest best practice relating to cyber risk 
management, and is believed to be useful for building or improving cyber risk 
management frameworks for banks (SIFMA, 2016; SARB, 2017; Deloitte, 2018).  
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The CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance provides that a bank should firstly have 
a cyber risk management framework (European Central Bank, 2016). The guidance 
contains guidelines that should be addressed within a bank’s cyber risk management 
framework (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). These guidelines are intended to strengthen the 
effective and consistent supervision and oversight of the banking industry’s cyber risk 
management (Financial Stability Board, 2016; European Central Bank, 2016).  
3.5.1 The purpose of the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance  
Recognising the sophisticated and evolving nature of cybercrime, the CPMI–IOSCO 
guidance contains guidelines that require evolving methods to address cyber risks 
(BIS & IOSCO, 2016). The primary purpose of this guidance is to mitigate the evolving 
risk of cybercrime in banking by providing the industry with guidance to improve their 
cyber resilience capabilities (Financial Stability Board, 2016). Cyber resilience, for the 
purposes of this guidance, means the ability of a bank to anticipate, withstand, contain 
and quickly recover from a cybercrime incident (BIS & IOSCO, 2016; World Bank 
Group, 2017).   
Even though this guidance may be applicable to other industries, it is primarily targeted 
towards the banking industry (European Central Bank, 2016). CPMI and IOSCO 
strongly recommend that banks should already have a cyber risk management 
framework, cyber risk controls, policies and practices in place, as the guidance is not 
meant to replace them but to enhance those (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). Therefore, this 
guidance should be considered only as a reference for overseeing and implementing 
a cyber risk management framework (Financial Stability Board, 2016). Most 
importantly, the guidelines of this guidance should not be applied in contradiction to 
applicable laws and regulations (SARB, 2017)  
Given the interconnectedness of the banking industry, it is important that all banks 
utilise this guidance in order to achieve the desired outcomes for cyber resilience 
(Financial Stability Board, 2016; European Central Bank, 2016; World Federation of 
Exchanges, 2018).  In May 2017, the SARB issued a guidance note, the purpose of 
which was to bring the attention of all South African banks to the CPMI–IOSCO cyber 
resilience guidance document (SARB, 2017). The SARB issued this guidance note to 
ensure that banks were developing cyber resilience capabilities enabling them to 
quickly recover from cybercrime incidents (Standard Bank, 2017). The CPMI–ISOCO 
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guidance document is the latest international best practice relating to cyber risk 
management (SARB, 2017). It is for this reason that the SARB requested banks to 
align their cyber risk management practices to this cyber resilience guidance (SARB, 
2017). In the guidance note, the SARB also mentioned that it would assess the 
adequacy of the banks' cyber risk management practices, based on the CPMI–IOSCO 
cyber resilience guidance (SARB, 2017).  
3.5.2 The CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines 
The CPMI–IOSCO guidance outlines eight guidelines made up of five fundamental 
risk management categories and three overarching categories that should be 
addressed within any cyber risk management framework for banks (BIS & IOSCO, 
2016; SARB, 2017). The fundamental categories include governance, identification, 
protection, detection, response and recovery, while overarching elements include 
testing, situational awareness, learning and evolving (World Bank Group, 2017; SARB, 
2017). These categories of guidelines were designed to lead cyber resilience 
strategies, standards and frameworks (European Central Bank, 2016). Below is a 
discussion of the CPMI– IOSCO guidelines. 
3.5.2.1 Governance 
Cyber governance refers to procedures implemented by banks to establish, execute 
and assess their cyber risk management practices (World Federation of Exchanges, 
2018). This process should start with a clear and comprehensive cyber risk 
management framework guided by the bank’s cyber resilience strategy and should be 
aligned to the organisation’s operational risk management framework (European 
Central Bank, 2016). The framework should define how the bank’s cyber resilience 
objectives and cyber risk tolerance will be determined, articulate how the bank will 
effectively detect, alleviate and manage cyber risks, and outline its people, processes 
and technology requirements to manage cyber risk (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). Most 
importantly, the framework should clearly define the board and management’s roles 
and responsibilities relating to cyber risk management (European Central Bank, 2016).  
First and foremost, the board’s responsibility is to set up the cyber risk management 
framework, endorse it, and set the bank’s cyber risk tolerance (World Federation of 
Exchanges, 2018).  Management, on the other hand, is responsible for overseeing the 
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implementation of the cyber risk management framework as well the controls, policies 
and practices that support it (European Central Bank, 2016).  
3.5.2.2 Identification 
The bank should identify its business functions and processes and perform a risk 
assessment thereon (World Federation of Exchanges, 2018). The risk assessment will 
help the bank to thoroughly understand the importance of each function and process, 
as well as how they are interdependent (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). The bank should then 
classify identified functions and processes in the order of their criticality (European 
Central Bank, 2016). This classification will inform the bank’s prioritisation of its cyber 
risk management efforts (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). The bank should repeat the same 
process for its information assets and system configurations (European Central Bank, 
2016).  Then the list of identified functions, processes, information assets and system 
configurations should be regularly reviewed and updated in order to ensure that it 
remains complete, accurate and current (European Central Bank, 2016). The bank 
should identify the cyber risks it assumes from and poses to other organisations with 
which they are interconnected (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). The bank, together with the 
organisations with which it is interconnected, should collaborate and improve overall 
cyber resilience capabilities (European Central Bank, 2016). 
3.5.2.3 Protection 
Even though Information and Communications Technology (hereafter, ICT) is not a 
focal point of this guidance, it is recommended that banks should build a strong ICT 
control environment because it is fundamental to cyber risk management (BIS & 
IOSCO, 2016). For example, the bank should have measures in place such as 
encryptions, access controls, and ICT system configurations (European Central Bank, 
2016). 
In addition to a strong ICT control environment, the bank should ensure that from the 
design stage of a system, it considers cyber resilience by implementing appropriate 
protective controls (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). Protective controls should be aligned to the 
bank’s cyber risk tolerance (European Central Bank, 2016). It is also important that 
the bank implements protective measures against insider threats such as previous and 
even current employees (World Federations of Exchanges, 2018). Banks can achieve 
this by performing background checks on new employees, regular checks on all 
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employees throughout their employment, role-based access controls, and staff 
training on detecting, reporting and addressing cyber risks (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). 
Further, protective controls against cyber risks posed by organisations with which the 
bank is interconnected must be implemented (World Federations of Exchanges, 
2018).  
3.5.2.4 Detection 
Banks need to ensure that they continuously monitor and detect cyberattacks in real 
time through establishing security operations centres (European Central Bank, 2016). 
Banks should be able to detect both publicly known and unknown cyberattacks, and 
should establish multi-layered detection controls that cover processes, technology and 
people (BIS & IOSCO, 2016; European Central Bank, 2016). Lastly, banks should 
have procedures in place to record and assess detected cyberattacks (BIS & IOSCO, 
2016).  
3.5.2.5 Response and recovery 
After detecting a cyberattack or attempt, a bank should launch an investigation in order 
to establish the nature and degree of damage caused by the attack (BIS & IOSCO, 
2016). During the investigation, the bank should take measures to address the 
situation in order to avoid more damage and most importantly, resume operations 
(European Central Bank, 2016). The bank’s systems should be designed in a way that 
the bank is able to safely resume critical functions within two hours of the cyberattack 
(World Federation of Exchanges, 2018). In addition to the two hours' recovery plan, 
banks should plan for scenarios where this objective may not be achievable due to the 
unavailability of critical people, processes, or systems for considerable periods 
(European Central Bank, 2016).The response, resumption and recovery plans should 
be tested for effectiveness and should be closely integrated with business continuity 
management, disaster recovery plans, and crisis management of the bank (World 
Federation of Exchanges, 2018).  
As it is important to maintain data integrity, banks should ensure that their processes 
and systems are designed and tested to recover accurate data after a cybercrime 
incident (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). Should data integrity be compromised after a 
successful cyberattack, banks may have to request uncorrupted data from third parties 
(European Central Bank, 2016). Therefore, banks should arrange to keep data backed 
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up with a trusted third party from whom the bank can request data in the event that 
data integrity is compromised following a cyberattack (BIS & IOSCO, 2016).   
3.5.2.6 Situational Awareness 
Banks should identify cyber risks that may potentially have a significant impact on their 
ability to perform business functions and settle obligations (European Central Bank, 
2016). Banks should also identify potential cyber risks with the availability, integrity 
and confidentiality of their business processes and reputation (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). 
The list of these cyber risks should be analysed, and the analysis regularly reviewed 
and updated (European Central Bank, 2016). This process will ensure the 
implementation of cyber resilience measures that are well cyber risk-informed (BIS & 
IOSCO, 2016). 
3.5.2.7 Learning and evolving 
Banks should have systems in place to identify lessons learnt from cybercrime 
occurrences, so they may improve their cyber risk management processes (European 
Central Bank, 2016). Banks must also keep an update of the latest technologies and 
new methods of cyber risk management (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). Furthermore, banks 
should not only be reactive but must also be proactive in order to effectively address 
future cyber risks (European Central Bank, 2016).  
3.5.2.8 Testing 
The bank’s cyber risk management framework should continuously be tested for 
effectiveness, and the test results should be used to improve its cyber resilience 
practices (BIS & IOSCO, 2016; European Central Bank, 2016). Various testing 
methods include vulnerability assessment, scenario-based testing, penetration tests 
and red team tests to test the effectiveness of the cyber risk management framework 
(European Central Bank, 2016).  
Vulnerability assessment involves detecting, assessing and remedying security 
weaknesses in the processes and systems of a bank (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). The bank 
should conduct a subsequent validation assessment to ensure that security 
weaknesses have been remedied (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). Scenario-based testing can 
be conducted by simulating a broad scope of possible scenarios to test the bank’s 
response, resumption, and recovery plans (European Central Bank, 2016). Banks 
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should also test the ability of their employees and processes to respond to uncommon 
scenarios of cyberattacks (BIS & IOSCO, 2016).  
A penetration test requires that weaknesses that might have an impact on the bank’s 
networks, systems, processes and people should be identified (European Central 
Bank, 2016). Furthermore, this test should simulate actual cyberattacks on the system 
to test whether the cyberattack is able to penetrate the system (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). 
This test should be performed on a regular basis, and each time the systems are 
updated (European Central Bank, 2016).  Red team tests involve setting up red teams, 
which test the bank’s cyber risk controls for effectiveness and possible weaknesses 
(BIS & IOSCO, 2016). A red team may comprise external experts or the bank’s own 
employees (European Central Bank, 2016). The bank should also participate in 
industry-wide testing, as this can help the bank to identify weaknesses that may not 
have been identified in its cyber risk management processes (BIS & IOSCO, 2016). 
3.6 CRITICAL LINK TO THE STUDY 
Having identified the cyber risks that the banking industry is exposed to and the need 
for effective cyber risk management methods, the study aimed at discussing cyber risk 
management frameworks for the South African banking industry and the CPMI– 
IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. This chapter identified the risk management 
framework currently adopted by the South African banking industry for managing cyber 
risk and discussed the ICIC framework and the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidance.  
3.7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter identified existing legislations designed to address cybercrime in South 
Africa. It was established that even though these legislations exist, the banking 
industry is still confronted with the risk of cybercrime. The South African banking 
industry manages risks, including cyber risk, through the implementation of the BASEL 
III framework. However, the BASEL III framework is not specific to the management 
of cyber risks, and therefore is ineffective in managing them. The chapter further 
discussed the ICIC framework, which was designed specifically to manage cyber risks, 
and is widely adopted by banks across the globe. The chapter highlighted the ability 
of the ICIC framework to be modified to suit any organisation’s specific needs and 
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objectives. This chapter also discussed the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance 
for FMIs, which provides that banks should have a cyber risk management framework 
that addresses the guidelines contained therein.  
In the following chapter, the ICIC framework practices are mapped against the                  
CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines. The results of the mapping are analysed 
and discussed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The literature review presented in Chapters 2 and 3 identified the cyber risks facing 
the banking industry. It also highlighted that this industry is the most vulnerable to 
cybercrime (Grobler, 2018). This is evidenced by the increased number of 
cyberattacks in the banking industry compared to other industries (Lagazio et al., 
2014). As a result, it is important for banks to ensure effective management of cyber 
risks (Shackleford, 2015). Effective cyber risk management ensures that potential 
cyberattacks do not occur, and that the impact of their occurrence is avoided or 
lessened (Wong & Shi, 2015).  
In the literature review, it was noted that South African banks are required by the SARB 
to align their cyber risk management processes to the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidance, which contains guidelines that should be addressed within a bank’s cyber 
risk management framework (BIS & IOSCO, 2016; SARB, 2017). The literature also 
identified BASEL III, a risk management framework currently adopted by the South 
African banking industry (Standard Bank, 2012). It was established in the literature 
review that the BASEL III framework is ineffective in managing cyber risks (Kopp et 
al., 2017). However, the ICIC framework is an effective, flexible and helpful framework 
for managing cyber risks (Roman, 2014). It is for this reason that the ICIC framework 
is widely adopted by a considerable number of banks internationally (Stechyshyn, 
2015).  
In this chapter the researcher analyses the ICIC framework, in order to map it against 
the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines. The research findings will be evaluated 
in order to establish whether the ICIC framework addresses the guidelines as set out 
in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance  
4.2 MAPPING OF THE ICIC FRAMEWORK AGAINST THE CPMI–IOSCO CYBER 
RESILIENCE GUIDELINES 
The CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines are made up of five fundamental risk 
management categories and three overarching categories, as discussed in Chapter 3 
(SARB, 2017).  Table 4.1 and 4.2 below present the categories in the first column. The 
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second column outlines the guidelines provided in each category. This information 
was extracted from the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance document issued in 
2016. The mapping takes place in the last column. The mapping was done by replying 
'YES' or 'NO' next to each CPMI–IOSCO guideline in the last column. 'YES' indicates 
that there is an ICIC framework practice that matches the CPMI–IOSCO guideline. 
'NO' indicates that the CPMI–IOSCO guideline is not addressed by the ICIC 
framework. An explanation of the outcome is also discussed. The ICIC framework 
practices are gathered through an analysis of the latest version 1.1 of the ICIC 
framework, which refines, clarifies and improves the preceding version (NIST, 2018).  
4.2.1 CPMI–IOSCO guidelines – fundamental risk management categories 
Table 4.1 presents the mapping of the ICIC framework against the CPMI–IOSCO 
cyber resilience guidelines provided under the fundamental risk management 
categories. 
Table 4.1: CPMI–IOSCO Guidelines – Fundamental risk management categories 
mapping 
FUNDAMENTAL 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
CATEGORIES 
(CPMI–IOSCO 
CYBER RESILIENCE 
GUIDANCE) 
GUIDELINES  
(CPMI–IOSCO CYBER 
RESILIENCE GUIDANCE) 
ICIC FRAMEWORK 
PRACTICES 
1. Governance 
1.1. The board should set up 
a cyber risk management 
framework, endorse it and 
set the bank’s cyber risk 
tolerance. 
YES 
When the bank adopts the 
ICIC framework, they would 
not need to set up a new 
framework. The ICIC 
framework stipulates that 
the bank should determine 
the level of cyber risk they 
consider acceptable, and 
this level should be 
expressed as a cyber risk 
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tolerance. This risk 
tolerance should be 
displayed in the selected 
implementation tier. 
Implementation tiers are 
discussed in section 3.4.3. 
1.2. Management should 
oversee the implementation 
of the cyber risk 
management framework and 
the controls, policies and 
practices that support it. 
YES 
As per the ICIC framework, 
management should 
approve and communicate 
the performance of the 
framework activities and   
ensure that framework 
activities are properly 
performed. 
1.3. The framework should 
define how the bank’s cyber 
risk tolerance will be 
determined. 
YES 
The bank’s cyber risk 
tolerance determination 
should be informed by the 
bank’s role in the country’s 
critical infrastructure and 
industry risk assessment. 
1.4. The framework should 
define how the bank’s cyber 
resilience objectives will be 
determined. 
NO 
The ICIC framework does 
not define how cyber 
resilience objectives will be 
determined. It only defines 
how to determine cyber 
resilience objectives that 
are not yet achieved. 
1.5. The framework should 
articulate how the bank will 
YES 
The ICIC framework core 
consists of functions that 
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effectively detect, alleviate 
and manage cyber risks. 
are intended to detect, 
alleviate and manage cyber 
risks. 
1.6. The framework should 
outline its people and 
processes to manage cyber 
risk. 
YES 
As per the ICIC framework, 
an organisation should 
identify and understand 
cyber risk management 
systems, processes and 
people. The processes are 
outlined in the framework 
core and the people should 
include the executive 
management level staff, the 
business/process level staff 
and the implementation/ 
operation level staff.  
1.7. The framework should 
outline technology 
requirements to manage 
cyber risk. 
NO 
The ICIC framework does 
not outline technology 
requirements to manage 
cyber risk. 
1.8. The framework should 
clearly define the board’s 
roles and responsibilities 
relating to cyber risk 
management. 
NO 
The role and 
responsibilities of the board 
regarding cyber risk 
management are not 
defined in the ICIC 
framework.  
1.9. The framework should 
clearly define management’s 
roles and responsibilities 
YES 
The roles and 
responsibilities of 
management are clearly 
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relating to cyber risk 
management. 
defined in the ICIC 
framework. Their role is to 
communicate and monitor 
the implementation of the 
framework activities.   
2. Identification 
2.1. Identify the bank’s 
business functions, 
processes, information 
assets and system 
configurations. 
YES 
This framework requires 
that the organisation should 
identify and understand its 
business context, critical 
functions, systems, its 
information and physical 
assets.  
2.2. Perform a risk 
assessment on the items 
identified in 2.1. 
YES 
In the ‘identify’ function of 
the ICIC framework, an 
organisation is required to 
perform risk assessment on 
the business, its critical 
functions, systems, 
information and physical 
assets. 
2.3. Classify the items in 2.1 
in the order of their criticality. 
YES 
The items identified above 
should be classified in the 
order of their criticality and 
business value so that they 
can be prioritised 
accordingly.  
2.4. The list generated in 2.3 
should be regularly reviewed 
and updated.  
NO 
The framework does not 
mention that there should 
be a regular review and 
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update of the list of the 
items above. 
2.5. Identify cyber risks the 
bank assumes from and 
poses to other organisations 
with which they are 
interconnected. 
NO 
The ICIC framework 
recognises that some cyber 
risks are assumed and 
posed to other 
organisations with which 
they are interconnected. 
However, it does not 
require that an organisation 
should specify where the 
identified cyber risk is 
assumed from or posed to.  
3. Protection 
3.1. Banks should build a 
strong ICT control 
environment (e.g. 
encryptions, access 
controls, and ICT system 
configurations). 
YES 
An organisation should set 
up appropriate safeguards, 
such as access control, 
protective technology and 
data security.   
3.2. From the design stage of 
a system, the bank should 
implement appropriate 
protective controls aligned to 
the bank’s cyber risk 
tolerance. 
YES 
Implementation of 
safeguards should be 
based on the set cyber risk 
tolerance.  
3.3. Implement protective 
measures against insider 
threats, such as previous 
and even current employees 
of the bank. 
YES 
Safeguards should be 
implemented against both 
internal and external 
threats. 
3.4. Implement protective 
controls against cyber risks 
YES 
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posed by the organisations 
with which the bank is 
interconnected. 
Even though an 
organisation is not required 
to specify that some 
identified cyber risks are 
posed by an organisation 
with which they are 
interconnected, safeguards 
should be implemented 
against all cyber risks 
identified. 
4. Detection 
4.1. Continuously monitor 
and detect cyberattacks in 
real time by setting up a 
security operations center. 
NO 
The ICIC framework 
provides that an 
organisation should 
establish detection 
processes and 
continuously monitor 
cybercrime events. 
However, it does not 
require that the monitoring 
and detection of cybercrime 
events be done in real time. 
4.2. Detect both publicly 
known and unknown 
cyberattacks. 
YES 
The ICIC frameworks 
requires that all 
cyberattacks should be 
detected, whether publicly 
known or unknown.   
4.3. Establish multi-layered 
detection controls that cover 
processes, technology and 
people. 
YES 
Detection controls include 
monitoring the physical 
environment, personnel 
activities, external service 
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provider activities, devices, 
software and systems for 
possible cybercrime 
events.  
4.4. Record and assess 
detected cyberattacks. 
YES 
An organisation should 
keep a record of detected 
and identified cyberattacks 
in order to assess how they 
are managed.  
5. Response and 
recovery 
5.1. After detecting a 
cyberattack or attempt, a 
bank should launch an 
investigation in order to 
establish the nature and 
degree of damage caused by 
the attack. 
YES 
Following a cyberattack, an 
organisation should 
analyse the impact thereof.  
5.2. Take measures to 
address the situation in order 
to avoid more damage. 
YES 
Measures that should be 
taken after detecting a 
cyberattack are, analyse 
the impact, implement 
measures to minimise that 
impact, improve protective 
measures that were 
penetrated by the cyber-
criminal, and recovery to 
normal operations.  
5.3. Design the bank’s 
system in a way that the 
bank is able to resume 
operations within at least two 
hours of the cyberattack. 
NO 
This framework does not 
provide the time within 
which to resume operations 
after a cyberattack. 
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However, it emphasises 
that resumption to normal 
operations should take 
place as soon as possible. 
5.4. Plan for scenarios where 
resuming within two hours 
may not be achievable due 
to unavailability of critical 
people, processes, or 
systems for considerable 
periods. 
NO 
This framework does not 
provide the time within 
which to resume operations 
after a cyberattack. 
However, it emphasises 
that resumption to normal 
operations should take 
place as soon as possible. 
5.5. The response, 
resumption and recovery 
plans should be tested for 
effectiveness. 
YES 
Tests and analysis of 
response and recovery 
activities should be 
conducted to ensure they 
are effective. 
5.6. The response, 
resumption and recovery 
plans should be closely 
integrated with business 
continuity management, 
disaster recovery plans and 
crisis management of the 
bank. 
YES 
An organisation’s response 
plans should be in line with 
business continuity plans. 
Recovery plans should be 
in line with disaster 
recovery plans.   
5.7. Ensure that processes 
and systems are designed 
and tested to recover 
accurate data after a 
cybercrime incident. 
YES 
Backups of data must be 
conducted, maintained and 
tested to ensure recovery 
of data following a 
cybercrime incident. 
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4.2.2 CPMI–IOSCO guidelines – overarching categories 
Table 4.2 presents the mapping of the ICIC frameworks against the CPMI–IOSCO 
cyber resilience guidelines provided under the overarching categories. 
Table 4.2: CPMI–IOSCO Guidelines – Overarching categories mapping 
OVERARCHING 
CATEGORIES 
 (CPMI – IOSCO 
CYBER RESILIENCE 
GUIDANCE) 
GUIDELINES 
(CPMI–IOSCO CYBER 
RESILIENCE GUIDANCE) 
ICIC FRAMEWORK 
PRACTICES 
6. Testing 
6.1. Continuously test the 
bank’s cyber risk 
management framework for 
effectiveness. 
NO 
This framework does not 
address the subject of 
framework testing.  
6.2. Use the test results to 
improve the cyber resilience 
practices. Various testing 
methods include 
vulnerability assessment, 
scenario-based testing, 
penetration tests and red 
team tests. These testing 
methods are discussed in 
section 3.5.2.8. 
NO 
This framework does not 
address the subject of 
framework testing. 
7. Situational 
awareness 
7.1. Identity cyber risks that 
may potentially have 
significant impact on the 
bank’s ability to perform 
business functions and settle 
its obligations. 
YES 
The ICIC framework 
requires that for each 
cyber risk identified, an 
analysis, including impact 
analysis, should be 
conducted thereon.  
7.2. Identify cyber risks that 
may have a potential impact 
YES 
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on the availability, integrity 
and confidentiality of 
business processes.  
The ICIC framework 
requires that for each 
cyber risk identified, an 
analysis, including impact 
analysis, should be 
conducted thereon. 
7.3. Identify cyber risks that 
may have a potential impact 
on the bank’s reputation. 
YES 
The ICIC framework 
requires that for each 
cyber risk identified, an 
analysis, including impact 
analysis, should be 
conducted thereon. 
7.4. The list of these cyber 
risks should be analysed, 
and the analysis should be 
regularly reviewed and 
updated. 
NO 
According to the ICIC 
framework, all cyber risks 
should be analysed. 
However, it is not specified 
anywhere in the ICIC 
framework that they should 
be regularly reviewed and 
updated. 
8. Learning and 
evolving 
8.1. Have systems in place 
to identify lessons learnt 
from cybercrime 
occurrences. 
YES 
Response plans should 
incorporate identifying and 
documenting lessons 
learned from detected 
cyberattacks. 
8.2. Use the lessons 
identified to improve the 
cyber risk management 
processes. 
YES 
Organisational response 
activities and cybersecurity 
activities should be 
improved by incorporating 
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lessons learned from 
cyberattack detection and 
response activities.   
8.3. Keep an update of the 
latest technologies and new 
methods of cyber risk 
management. 
YES 
An organisation needs to 
actively adapt to evolving 
technology and 
cybersecurity methods in 
order to effectively manage 
this ever-evolving 
cybercrime.  
 
The analysis of the results from the mapping conducted in Table 4.1 and 4.2 above 
are presented and discussed in the following section. 
4.3 RESEARCH FINDINGS: THE CPMI–IOSCO CYBER RESILIENCE GUIDELINES 
ADDRESSED BY THE ICIC FRAMEWORK 
The aim of this research is to establish whether the ICIC framework addresses the 
guidelines as set out in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. The mapping in 
Table 4.1 and 4.2 was conducted in order to determine the degree to which the ICIC 
framework addresses the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines. Figure 4.1 below 
presents the analysis of the results from the mapping.  
 
Figure 4.1: An analysis of the mapping of the ICIC framework against the CPMI–
IOSCO guidelines 
71% 72%
67%
29% 28%
33%
ALL CATEGORIES FUNDAMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
CATEGORIES
OVERARCHING CATEGORIES
Addressed Not addressed
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The results from the mapping reveal that the degree to which the ICIC framework 
addresses all the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines is 71 percent. The CPMI– 
IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines not addressed by the ICIC framework are mostly 
made up of guidelines provided under the overarching categories. The 33 percent of 
guidelines not addressed under the overarching categories are mainly represented by 
the ‘testing’ category. This is because the ICIC framework does not address 
‘framework testing’. Only 28 percent of the guidelines provided under the fundamental 
risk management categories are not addressed by the ICIC framework. The 28 percent 
is predominantly represented by the guidelines provided under the ‘governance’ 
category, owing to the fact that the same categories of guidelines under fundamental 
risk management, except ‘governance’, make up the ICIC framework core discussed 
in section 3.4.1. 
4.4 RECOMMENDED CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
According to the SARB guidance note issued to South African banks in 2017, South 
African banks must align their cyber risk management processes to the CPMI–IOSCO 
cyber resilience guidance (Standard Bank, 2017). The guidance requires that banks 
should have a cyber risk management framework in place. This cyber risk 
management framework must address the guidelines contained in the CPMI–IOSCO 
cyber resilience guidance. The ICIC framework addresses up to 71 percent of these 
guidelines.  
It was established that as a result of the ICIC framework being flexible, an organisation 
can modify it to meet its specific needs and objectives. Therefore, the study 
recommends that, instead of building a new cyber risk management framework, South 
African banks should adopt the ICIC framework, as it already significantly addresses 
the CPMI–IOSCO guidelines. South African banks can then modify it by adding only 
29 percent of the CPMI–IOSCO guidelines not addressed by the ICIC framework. In 
that manner, all the CPMI–IOSCO guidelines will be addressed by the modified 
version of the ICIC framework. The researcher recommends the ICIC framework to 
the South African banking industry for the following reasons: 
 Unlike the BASEL framework, it is not generic to overall risks, but is specific to 
cyber risk management; 
 It already addresses a considerable number of the CPMI–IOSCO guidelines; 
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 It has been adopted by numerous banks across the globe; 
 It has proven to be effective for managing cyber risks; 
 It is efficient, cost effective and easy to implement; and 
 It is flexible. 
South African banks should modify the ICIC framework by adding the following 
features to it (BIS & IOSCO, 2016):  
 The way in which the bank’s cyber resilience objectives will be established 
should be defined in the framework. 
 In the framework, the bank should define all the technology they require to 
manage cyber risk.  
 The framework should clearly describe the roles and responsibilities of the 
board and management regarding cyber risk management. 
 The list of identified business functions, information assets, system 
configurations and processes should be regularly reviewed and updated. 
 Identify the cyber risks that the bank is exposed to as a result of its 
interconnection with other organisations. 
 Identify the cyber risks that the bank poses to other organisations with which 
they are interconnected. 
 The bank’s systems must be designed in a manner that allows for operations 
to resume within at least two hours after a cyberattack.  
 Plan for cases whereby resuming within two hours may not be possible 
because of unavailable critical people, processes, or systems for considerable 
periods. 
 The list of cyber risks threatening the bank’s reputation, ability to perform 
business functions, and the availability, integrity and confidentiality of business 
processes, should be analysed and the analysis should be regularly reviewed 
and updated. 
 The bank’s cyber risk management framework (in this case, the ICIC 
framework) must be continuously tested for effectiveness. 
 The test results must be used to develop and enhance cyber risk management 
practices.  
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4.5 CRITICAL LINK TO THE STUDY 
The main objective of the study was to recommend to the South African banking 
industry, a cyber risk management framework that is effective and that addresses the 
guidelines contained in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. This chapter 
mapped the ICIC framework to the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines in order 
to establish the extent to which the ICIC framework addresses the guidelines as set 
out in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. This chapter also recommended 
the ICIC framework to the South African banking industry.  
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter reflected on the aim of the study, which is to establish whether the ICIC 
framework addresses the guidelines as set out in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidance. The aim of the study was achieved by mapping the ICIC framework to the 
CPMI–IOSCO guidelines. This was conducted in order to test the degree to which the 
ICIC framework addresses the CPMI–IOSCO guidelines. The mapping results 
revealed that 71 percent of the CPMI–IOSCO guidelines are addressed by the ICIC 
framework. The researcher recommended that South African banks adopt the ICIC 
framework and modify it by adding to it the 29 percent of the CPMI–IOSCO guidelines 
not addressed by the ICIC framework. By so doing, all the CPMI–IOSCO guidelines 
will addressed by the modified ICIC framework. Moreover, the ICIC framework is 
effective, efficient, flexible, cost effective and easy to implement.  
The following chapter summarises the results deduced from the literature review and 
the empirical study. Thereafter, conclusions are drawn and areas for future research 
suggested. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a summary of the results deduced from the literature review in 
chapter 2 and 3. This chapter will also highlight the results of the empirical study 
presented in chapter 4. Finally, this chapter will suggest possible areas for future 
research.  
5.2 DEDUCTIONS 
The literature review in Chapter 2 and 3 indicated that due to technological 
advancements, the banking industry is experiencing greater efficiency and 
effectiveness in business. At the same time, threats such as cyber risk have surfaced 
as a result of these technological advancements. The banking industry is the most 
attacked industry by cyber-criminals, thus banks should implement effective cyber risk 
management processes. The literature review also indicated that cyber risk 
management processes implemented by South African banks should be aligned to the 
CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. The CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidance provides that banks should have a cyber risk management framework and 
that this framework must address the guidelines contained in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber 
resilience guidance. Finally, the literature review discussed the ICIC framework. It was 
established that the ICIC framework is effective, efficient, flexible, cost effective and 
easy to implement. Chapter 4 mapped the ICIC framework against the CPMI–IOSCO 
cyber resilience guidelines in order to establish the degree to which the ICIC 
framework addresses the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines. The following 
sections summarise the results from the literature review and the empirical study. 
5.2.1 Literature review 
The results deduced from the literature review are as follows:  
 The banking industry has experienced the most cybercrime incidents compared 
to other industries. 
 The nature of cybercrime in banking will continue to evolve.  
 With the continuous growth in technology, cybercrime incidents have become 
numerous and sophisticated.  
 
 
52 
 
 In addition to IT and advancements in technology, other causes of cybercrime 
include global connectivity, the internet, and the digitisation of banks.  
 The risk of cybercrime in African countries including South Africa, is magnified 
by the lack of IT skills and appropriate legal frameworks at national level. 
 A common range of cybercrimes include identity theft, malware, social 
engineering, DDoS, and botnets.  
 A phishing attack, which is one of the types of malware, is the most frequent 
cybercrime in South African banks. 
 According to security experts, 91 percent of all cybercrimes start with a phishing 
attack. 
 One of the most extreme cybercrimes is ransomware, which is another type of 
malware where the cyber-criminal locks user access to files and systems and 
then demands a ransom to unlock user access.  
 Cybercrime incidents have detrimental impacts on the banking industry, for 
example, financial losses, fraud, reputational damage, impacts on 
competitiveness and business interruptions. 
 Given the detrimental impacts that cybercrime has on the banking industry, and 
the industry being the most targeted by cyber-criminals, it is vital for banks to 
employ effective cyber risk management processes. 
 Cyber risk management processes employed by banks should keep pace with 
the evolving nature of cybercrime. 
 Banks should adopt a framework that is designed specifically to manage cyber 
risk, because a framework designed to manage an organisation’s overall risk is 
not sufficient to manage cyber risks. 
 BASEL III, a framework adopted by the South African banking industry, is not 
sufficient for managing cyber risk because it is generic to overall risks. 
 The ICIC framework was designed to specifically manage cyber risks. 
 The ICIC framework is effective for managing cyber risk, efficient, cost effective 
and easy to implement. 
 The ICIC framework is flexible, hence an organisation can modify it to meet its 
specific needs and objectives. 
 The ICIC framework is widely adopted by banks across the globe and has been 
found to be useful and effective. 
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 South African banks are required by the SARB to align their cyber risk 
management process to the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance 
document. 
 The South African Registrar of Banks will use the CPMI–IOSCO cyber 
resilience guidance document as a basis to assess the adequacy of the South 
African banks’ cyber risk management processes. 
 The CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance provides that banks must have a 
cyber risk management framework that addresses the guidelines contained in 
the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. 
5.2.2 The empirical study and research findings 
The results deduced from the empirical study are as follows: 
 The ICIC framework addresses up to 71 percent of the guidelines contained in 
the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance document. 
 Only 28 percent of the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines under the 
fundamental risk management categories are not addressed by the ICIC 
framework. 
 The remaining 28 percent of the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines 
under the fundamental risk management categories not addressed by the ICIC 
framework, is mostly represented by the ‘governance’ guidelines. 
 67 percent of CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines provided under the 
overarching categories are addressed by the ICIC framework. 
 The 33 percent of the guidelines provided under the overarching categories not 
addressed by the ICIC framework is due to the fact that the ICIC framework 
does not address ‘framework testing’. 
5.3 POSSIBLE AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study recommends the ICIC framework to the South African banking industry. 
The framework is recommended because with the implementation of this framework, 
South African banks will achieve effective cyber risk management and the framework 
will address all the CPMI–IOSCO guidelines after it is modified. The SARB announced 
this request through a guidance note issued in May 2017. The following possible area 
for future research is suggested: 
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 An investigation of cyber risk management measures or frameworks adopted 
by South African banks following the guidance note issued by the SARB and 
establish if they address the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines. 
 Exploring other frameworks to establish the extension to which they address 
the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines, in order to consider a hybrid 
framework. 
 Mapping the BASEL III framework against the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidance to determine how far it addresses the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience 
guidelines. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented a summary of the results deduced from the literature review, 
and the research findings from the empirical study. The study investigated cybercrimes 
that the banking industry is faced with. It was found that in South Africa, phishing 
attacks are the most frequent cybercrime.  It was highlighted that it is important for the 
banking industry to implement effective cyber risk management processes, as it is the 
industry most targeted by cyber-criminals. As required by the SARB, South African 
banks should align their cyber risk management processes to the CPMI–IOSCO cyber 
resilience guidance, which provides that banks should have a cyber risk management 
framework. This cyber risk management framework should address the guidelines 
contained in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidance. The main aim of the study 
was to establish whether the ICIC guidelines contained in the CPMI–IOSCO cyber 
resilience guidance are addressed within the ICIC framework. The research findings 
revealed that the ICIC framework addresses up to 71 percent of the CPMI–IOSCO 
cyber resilience guidelines. Having established that, the researcher recommended 
that South African banks should adopt the ICIC framework and modify it by adding the 
29 percent of the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines not addressed by the ICIC 
framework. The researcher recommends the ICIC framework because it already 
addresses the CPMI–IOSCO cyber resilience guidelines significantly, and after 
modification it will address all of them. Moreover, the ICIC framework is effective, 
flexible, cost-effective and easy to implement.  
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